Not a Matter of Interpretation by Knapp, Steven & Michaels, Walter Benn




Not a Matter of Interpretation 
STEVEN KNAPP*                                                                             
WALTER BENN MICHAELS** 
 
Justice Scalia famously begins his dissent in Johnson v. Santa Clara 
County by describing the text of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
as written “[w]ith a clarity which, had it not proven so unavailing, one 
might well recommend as a model of statutory draftsmanship.”1  It is the 
“unavailing,” of course, that gives the remark both its wit and its pathos.  
Scalia’s point is that, despite the clarity with which they wrote, the 
authors of the statute were unable to keep it from being misinterpreted.  
Although the text says it shall be “unlawful” to “refuse to hire . . . any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin,”2 the majority decision makes it lawful for the county of 
Santa Clara to have refused to hire Paul Johnson because he was a man.  
Therefore, Scalia insists, the majority “completes the process of converting” 
Title VII “from a guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for 
employment determinations, to a guarantee that it often will.”3  What the 
text says you cannot do, its interpreters now say you can do. 
The question of whether Title VII forbids affirmative action is 
obviously an important legal question, but our interest here is in an 
interpretive problem rather than a legal one.  Put in Scalia’s terms, the 
interpretive problem is the following: How can a text written with such 
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clarity nonetheless be misinterpreted?  One of the few rules of statutory 
interpretation that everyone accepts, Scalia says in his influential 
contribution to A Matter of Interpretation, is the rule that “when the text 
of a statute is clear, that is the end of the matter.”4  But, Scalia thinks, the 
text here is a very model of clarity, and yet that has not been the end of 
the matter.  Why not? 
One possibility, of course, is that there really is no dispute over what 
the statute means, and Scalia himself may be pointing in this direction 
when he describes the way in which the same majority’s earlier decision 
in Weber5 thoroughly “rewrote . . . the statute it purported to construe.”6  
If “purported” here means something like “pretended” (a meaning the 
dictionary sanctions, and dictionary definitions matter to those convinced by 
Scalia’s theory of interpretation), then Scalia may be suggesting that the 
majority is not so much misinterpreting Title VII as ignoring or 
replacing it.  And if that is true, then of course there is no interpretive 
disagreement, and the authors’ efforts were unavailing only in the sense 
that they could not get the Court to obey their text not in the sense that 
they could not get the Court to understand it.  The actions of the majority 
in ignoring the meaning of the statute may be ethically and/or politically 
problematic, but they are theoretically uninteresting.  We do not need a 
theory of interpretation to explain what is going on when people make 
up new laws instead of interpreting the old ones.  So if there is to be an 
interpretive issue here, we have to assume that the disagreement between 
Scalia and the majority in Johnson is not a disagreement about whether 
affirmative action is a good thing (although they may well disagree 
about that) but is instead a disagreement about the entirely different 
question of whether affirmative action is permitted by Title VII. 
Perhaps, then, the meaning of the statute is not quite as clear as Scalia 
says it is.  Indeed, it does seem that if the dispute here really is an 
interpretive one—if it really is a dispute over what the text means and 
not a disagreement about the right thing to do—the statute cannot possibly 
be as clear as Scalia says it is.  A look at the statute suggests, however, 
that Scalia is at least in some sense right about its clarity.  It is not in any 
obvious way ambiguous or vague.  Again, if you looked up the words in 
the dictionary, you would not find surprising or confusing secondary 
definitions.  So how can two different readers—in good faith (and for 
there to be a genuinely interpretive dispute we must, as we have just 
noted, assume good faith)—disagree?  What are they disagreeing about? 
 4. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 5. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 6. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 670 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Scalia’s answer emerges if we begin by asking what he calls “the 
basic question” of statutory interpretation: “What are we looking for 
when we construe a statute?”7  In light of this question, the problem with 
the majority justices’ position is not that they cannot understand the 
plain meaning of the statute but that they are not looking for its plain 
meaning.  They are rejecting the idea that the plain meaning of the text 
counts as the text’s meaning and are looking instead for something else: 
what the legislature intended.  The disagreement here, in other words, is 
a theoretical one—it is a dispute about what the proper object of 
interpretation should be, about whether it should be what Scalia calls 
“the objective indication of the words” (what the authors said), or 
whether it should be “the intent of the legislature” (what the authors 
meant).8 
Scalia’s main argument for what he calls “textualism” and against 
“intentionalism” is that intentionalism “is simply incompatible with 
democratic government.”9  And, although we will return shortly to the 
question of whether that is true, we need to begin by asking a more 
fundamental question: Do textualism and intentionalism, as Scalia 
understands them, really give us two different objects of interpretation?  
The reason for asking this question is obvious.  It has, in fact, been 
provided by Scalia himself in his description of the clarity with which 
Title VII was written, and in his implication that not all texts are so 
clearly written.  What is the difference between authors who express 
themselves clearly and authors who do not?  The seemingly obvious 
answer is that authors who write clearly are authors who make it easy for 
their readers to understand what they mean, while authors who do not 
 7. Scalia, supra note 4, at 16. 
 8. For our previous arguments in defense of intentionalism, see Steven Knapp & 
Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723 (1982); Steven Knapp 
& Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Our Critics, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 790 (1983); 
Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Richard Rorty: What Is Pragmatism?, 
11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 466 (1985) (reprinted along with preceding two items in AGAINST 
THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985)); 
Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49 (1987); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, 
Intention, Identity, and the Constitution: A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL 
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 187 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992); Steven 
Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Reply to George Wilson, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 186 
(1992); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Reply to John Searle, 25 NEW LITERARY 
HIST. 669 (1994).  See also Steven Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive Controversy, 
in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 323 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
 9. Scalia, supra note 4, at 17. 




write so clearly make it hard or even impossible for their readers to 
understand them.  Therefore, when we read the texts of unclear authors, 
we are more likely to misunderstand them and to come up with incorrect 
interpretations.  But what are the incorrect interpretations incorrect 
interpretations of? 
Take Scalia’s example of the meaning of the word “bay.”  “If you tell 
me, ‘I took the boat out on the bay,’” he says, “I understand ‘bay’ to 
mean one thing; if you tell me, ‘I put the saddle on the bay,’ I understand 
it to mean something else.”10  Thus, someone who understood “I took 
the boat out on the bay” to mean something like “I loaded the boat onto 
the back of the reddish-brown horse and took it for a ride” would have 
misunderstood the sentence.  But what was misunderstood would not be 
what the word “bay” meant.  The whole point of  the example is that if 
you look the word up in the dictionary, you will see that it means a 
“reddish-brown” horse, and that it also means “a body of water partially 
enclosed by land” (not to mention “any of certain . . . trees or shrubs 
with aromatic foliage” and a surprising number of other things).11 
What you want to know, however, is not just what meanings the word 
“bay” can have according to the rules of English, but what meaning it 
has when used on this particular occasion by this particular speaker.  
And, of course, looking it up will not help you with that.  If, in other 
words, you have misunderstood the sentence “I took the boat out on the 
bay,” your problem is not that you do not know the many meanings of 
the word “bay.”  On the contrary, it is precisely because you do know at 
least two of those meanings that you do not know what meaning the 
word “bay” has in this sentence.  This is to say, you have misunderstood 
not what the word means, but what the author meant.  Indeed, the very 
idea of a clear text (a text written in such a way that it is not likely to be 
misunderstood), or rather the very idea of the difference between a clear 
and an unclear text, relies on the presumption that the object of 
interpretation (what the interpreter is trying to figure out) is the author’s 
intention. 
We can see this by simply imagining how we might respond to the 
sentence about the bay if we were not interested in what its speaker 
intended.  If we felt we did not fully understand the meaning of the word 
“bay,” we might look it up in the dictionary, and thereby be reminded of 
other possible meanings (for example, “a part of a building marked off 
by vertical elements”12).  But, of course, the dictionary would not tell us 
 10. Id. at 26. 
 11. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 154 (Joseph 
P. Picket et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE]. 
 12. Id. 
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which of the meanings listed was the right one.  Indeed, the very existence 
of the list would make the question of which of the listed meanings was 
the right one incomprehensible; if the word “bay” means all those things, 
then it can not be right to choose just one of them.  So we not only 
would not get any help in figuring out which of the possible meanings 
was the right one, we would not have any reason to look for the right one 
because we would not have any reason to think that one was more right 
than the others.  The point here is not epistemological—it would be hard 
to figure out which one was right.  The problem instead is ontological—they 
would all be right.  They would all be right because if we thought that 
the meaning of the sentence was a function of what the words meant, 
rather than a function of what the author meant by the words, then every 
text would mean everything its words could mean in the language in 
which the text was written.  None of the dictionary meanings would be 
merely possible; all would be actual. 
Insofar, then, as the opposition between a clear text and an unclear 
text relies on the difference between a text’s being understood and its 
being misunderstood, that opposition requires a reference to the author’s 
intention.  The only way a sentence like “I took the boat out on the bay” 
can be interpreted to mean “I went sailing” instead of “I used the horse 
to carry the dinghy,” is by reference to what its speaker means.  And, 
again, the point here is not that if we do not look for the speaker’s 
intention, we will have no way of figuring out what the right meaning is; 
it is that if we are not looking for the speaker’s intention, we have no 
reason to think that any meaning should count as the right one. 
A clear writer, then, is a writer who is good at making herself understood, 
a writer who chooses or arranges words in such a way that her reader 
will understand what she means by them.  But to say this is just to say 
that a clear writer is a writer who is good not at making you understand 
what the words mean (the dictionary does that) but at making you 
understand what she intends.  The sentence “I am heading out on the 
bay” clearly means one thing when spoken by someone sticking her foot 
in the stirrup and (just as clearly) means something else when spoken by 
someone stepping into the dinghy, and its meaning may not be clear at 
all when it is spoken by someone with one foot in the stirrup and the 
other foot on the boat.  In any case, the difference between when it is 
clear and when it is not clear is entirely a difference between when it 
communicates what the author intends to communicate and when it does 
not.  As soon as you start thinking of  the meaning of a text as the sort of 




thing that authors can try to express clearly, and of clarity as something 
they can either achieve or fail to achieve, then you have already committed 
yourself to the idea that what the text means is what the author meant by 
it.  The Justice Scalia who believes that texts can be clearly or unclearly 
written is not a textualist but an intentionalist, and the choice he presents 
us with—the choice between what the authors said and what the authors 
meant—is a false choice. 
This is why Scalia’s explanation of how we figure out whether the 
“bay” is a horse or a body of water is mistaken.  According to Scalia, 
what we do here is invoke the “principle that a word is given meaning by 
those around it.”13  The mention of a boat makes the bay a body of water; 
the mention of a saddle makes it a horse.  It is not the intent of the author 
that matters, according to Scalia, it is the “context.”14  But why does the 
context matter?  If you have just asked me how I am going to get the 
boat out of here, and, as I strap the dinghy onto the horse, I say, “I am 
taking the boat out on the bay,” the context no doubt makes it clear what 
“bay” means.  And even though one of the words around “bay” is “boat,” it 
does not mean “body of water.”  The context is relevant because the 
context is evidence of what I mean.  The word is not “given meaning by 
[the words] around it,”15 but the words around it may well provide 
evidence of what meaning the speaker is giving to it, as may the speaker’s 
actions, the look on his face, the tone of his voice, etc. 
With Title VII, or with almost any written text, we do not know much 
about the looks on peoples’ faces, of course.  And the words around the 
disputed ones will no doubt play a crucial role in helping us decide what 
we think the disputed words mean.  But that is what the records of 
congressional debate, and all the other texts to which intentionalists have 
recourse, also do.  Indeed, that is the only reason that the one source 
textualists really approve of—the dictionary—is at all relevant.  A standard 
literary critical example of this point is the reference to his “vegetable 
love” by the speaker in Andrew Marvell’s “To his coy Mistress.”16  What 
does the word “vegetable” mean?  Here is what the American Heritage 
Dictionary17 says about the word’s history in its entry on “vegetable”: 
   Andrew Marvell’s “To his coy Mistress” contains many striking phrases and 
images, but perhaps most puzzling to modern readers is one in this promise 
from the speaker to his beloved: “Had we but world enough, and time . . . /My 
 13. Scalia, supra note 4, at 26. 
 14. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 147 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 15. See id. at 26. 
 16. ANDREW MARVELL, To his coy Mistress, in ANDREW MARVELL 24 (Frank 
Kermode & Keith Walker eds., 1990). 
 17. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 11. 
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vegetable love should grow/Vaster than empires and more slow.”  One critic has 
playfully praised Marvell for his ability to make one “think of pumpkins and 
eternity in one breath,” but vegetable in this case is only indirectly related to 
edible plants.  Here the word is used figuratively in the sense “having the 
property of life and growth, as does a plant,” a use based on an ancient religious 
and philosophical notion of the tripartite soul.  As interpreted by the Scholastics, 
the vegetative soul was common to plants, animals, and humans; the sensitive 
soul was common to animals and humans; and the rational soul was found only 
in humans.  “Vegetable love” is thus a love that grows, takes nourishment, and 
reproduces, although slowly. Marvell’s 17th-century use illustrates the original 
sense of vegetable, first recorded in the 15th century.  In 1582 we find recorded 
for the first time the adjective use of vegetable familiar to us, “having to do with 
plants.”  In a work of the same date appears the first instance of vegetable as a 
noun, meaning “a plant.”  It is not until the 18th century that we find the noun 
and adjective used more restrictively to refer specifically to certain kinds of 
plants that are eaten.18 
Set aside the dictionary’s own intentionalism (“Here the word is used 
figuratively”19—what are you making a decision about when you decide 
whether a word is being used figuratively or literally?).  The relevant 
issue here is the description of  the word “vegetable” as having an 
“original sense”—still operative, the dictionary tells us, in the seventeenth 
century—and a more “restrictive” and more modern one, not yet operative 
in Marvell’s time.  So when we try to figure out what “vegetable” means 
in Marvell’s poem, do we want the meaning that a seventeenth-century 
dictionary would have given us—“growing”?  Or the meaning that a 
twenty-first-century dictionary would give us—“edible plant-like”?  Suppose 
we choose the seventeenth-century dictionary.  How can we justify our 
choice to someone who prefers the twenty-first-century one?  The obvious 
answer—the text was written in the seventeenth century, why should it 
matter what the word came to mean later—will just as obviously not 
work if we remain true to our textualism.  Intentionalists will prefer the 
seventeenth-century dictionary because intentionalists will regard the 
definition it gives as evidence of what Marvell intended.  But textualists 
do not care what Marvell intended. 
Perhaps, as textualists, we could say that we are not interested in 
knowing what Marvell intended, we are just interested in knowing what 
language the text is in and finding out what “vegetable” means in that 
language.  So what language is it in?  The problem here, of course, is 
that the question of what language the text is in is a question about what 
language it was written in, and the answer to that question involves 
 18. Id. at 1906. 
 19. Id. 




asking about Marvell again.  Was he using seventeenth-century English 
and attaching the signified “growing” to the signifier “vegetable,” or was 
he using twenty-first-century English and attaching the signified “edible 
plant-like” to it?  Even if, as textualists, we are interested in what the 
words mean in the language, and not in what Marvell meant by them, it 
turns out that the question of what language the words are in is really 
only a disguised version of the question of what Marvell meant by them.  
Thus, once again, the answer to Scalia’s question—what are we looking 
for when we construe a text20—turns out to be (even for those who think 
they are looking for what the words mean instead of what the author 
means) the author’s intention. 
Put more generally, we could say that the opposition between 
intentionalism, as a historical inquiry into what some author or authors 
did, and textualism, as a linguistic inquiry into the ways in which some 
word is defined, is a false opposition.  We cannot even ask the linguistic 
question of how the word is defined until we have some account of what 
language the word is in, and our sense of what language the word is in is 
already a function of our understanding of an historical event: the 
production of the text.  To see this, all we have to do is imagine two 
languages that look exactly alike—the only thing that distinguishes them 
is their semantics; the words in L1 (call it English) mean something 
different from the words in L2 (call it Schmenglish).  The fundamental 
question we confront with any text written in either of these languages is 
the question of which language it is in, and that question can only be 
answered by an account of which set of semantic rules the author of the 
text was following. 
And once we realize that the question of what we are looking for can 
only be answered by an account of which set of semantic rules the author 
was following, we realize that the English/Schmenglish hypothetical 
actually describes a fairly standard situation.  Any time anybody uses a 
word to mean something even slightly different from the meaning it has 
in English, he or she is speaking some kind of Schmenglish, even if this 
Schmenglish differs from English not with respect to its entire semantics 
but only with respect to the one word in question.  From that point of 
view it makes sense to say that the meaning of every text is governed by 
the semantic rules of the language in which it is written, but only 
because it also makes sense to say that what those rules are—what 
language it is and, therefore, what rules matter—is entirely up to the 
author.  From this standpoint, judges inquiring into the records of 
legislative debates are just trying to figure out which language the text 
they are being asked to read is written in. 
 20. Scalia, supra note 4, at 16. 
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But this way of putting the point is, of course, precisely what makes 
textualists unhappy and the political motives of textualism relevant—the 
sense that only textualism corresponds to the needs of a democracy and 
makes possible the rule of law.  How can we be expected to follow laws 
written in languages we do not understand?  How can we be expected to 
understand texts that do not follow rules we know?  It is important to 
recognize that this is a perfectly reasonable, but—from the standpoint of 
the theory of interpretation—completely empty question.  If I speak in 
English to a group of people who only speak French, it is surely the case 
that I will have a very hard time being understood, and if I am saying 
something important to them and to me, it may well be disastrous that I 
did not use my less fluent but still serviceable French.  But the fact that 
not a single person understood me or could plausibly have been expected 
to understand me in no way affects the meaning of my utterance.  And, of 
course, the same thing is true if I speak not in English but in Schmenglish.  
The question of meaning and the question of communication are two 
different questions, as is obvious any time anyone says something that is 
understood by some people, but not by everyone.  If you understand my 
utterance, I have succeeded in communicating with you; if your friend 
does not understand it, I have failed to communicate with him.  But the 
meaning of my utterance, whatever it is, is the same and would be the 
same if both of you understood it, or if neither of you did.  And if I am 
speaking Schmenglish, your insistence on applying the rules of English 
will be of no greater use to you than it would be if I were speaking 
French. 
This does not mean that you cannot insist on treating my utterance as 
if it were in English.  It just means that if you do, you are insisting on 
treating the actual historical event that took place—the use of some set 
of semantic rules to mean something—as if it were a different historical 
event—the use of some other set of semantic rules to mean something 
else.  Treating texts as if they were produced through the use of a certain 
set of rules, regardless of whether they actually were, textualists are not 
choosing between what the author intended and what the text says.  They 
are choosing between what the author actually intended and a fictional 
alternative, for example, what they think the author should have 
intended.  Properly understood, then, textualism is a theory about what 
the text should have meant, and not about how it should be interpreted.  
When there is a discrepancy between the rules the authors actually 
followed and the rules textualists believe they ought to have followed, 




textualists want to invoke the rules the authors ought to have followed.  
From the standpoint of the theory of interpretation, they are in the 
position of someone who believes that everyone ought to speak 
English and who, therefore, treats every utterance as if it were in 
English, even if the actual author of the utterance may sometimes be 
speaking French. 
From this standpoint, it cannot exactly be true that the problem with 
textualism is that, like intentionalism, it “treats statutes as static texts and 
assumes that the meaning of a statute is fixed from the date of enactment.”21  
The date of enactment may be relevant if we are interested in figuring out 
the actual language the author used, but it is by no means necessarily 
relevant to the question of what language we think the author ought to 
have used.  That question is a question about us, about what we think.  
So textualism is not quite as “dreary” as the proponents of a more 
“dynamic” interpretation make it out to be.  But it does not follow that 
what one of the most prominent of these proponents, William Eskridge, 
calls the “interpreter’s perspective”22 is relevant to legal (or any other 
kind of) interpretation.  For one thing, as we have already seen, textualism 
achieves its (unwanted) dynamism only through a kind of arbitrary 
stipulation (treat the text as English whether or not it is English)—a 
stipulation that, if they acknowledged it, textualists would presumably 
give up.  At which point, they would indeed become truly static and 
dreary because, as we have seen, they would become intentionalists.  
Furthermore, Eskridge’s own account of the relevance of perspective to 
interpretation—“[t]he interpreter’s perspective makes a difference in 
statutory interpretation: two different people acting in good faith often 
interpret the same text in different ways”23—makes a point exactly 
opposite to the one he hopes to make. 
Eskridge illustrates the point he hopes to make by citing his own 
experience in reading Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, first when young, 
and later as an adult, when, “inspired by scholarship concerning female 
friendships in the nineteenth century and my own identity as a gay man,” 
he came to “consider Jane’s and Helen’s relationship in romantic 
terms”24—a thought, he says, that would have been “inconceivable” 
to him when younger.25  The idea here is that the change in his own 
“view” of the text is also a change in the text’s “meaning,”26 and that 
the difference between the young reader of Bronte and the older one 
 21. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9 (1994). 
 22. Id. at 49. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 59–60. 
 25. Id. at 59. 
 26. Id. 
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exemplifies the situation in which the readers of both literary and 
legal texts “disagree with one another” about what the text means.27 
But how can this be true?  How do people who read Bronte without 
reference to their experience as gay men (because they are not gay or 
they are not men) count as disagreeing with Eskridge?  What are they 
disagreeing with him about?  You and I are not disagreeing if Jane Eyre 
makes you think of the intensity of certain kinds of same-sex friendship, 
and makes me think of how constricted women’s lives were in the 
nineteenth century; we are just being made to think about different 
things.  The fact that Jane Eyre makes you think of the former (subversion 
of gender roles) only counts against its making me think of the latter (the 
rigidity of gender roles) if you also believe that Jane Eyre ought to make 
me think of what it makes you think of, and that if it does not, I am not 
only interpreting the text but misinterpreting it.  If, in other words, your 
experience makes you think of one thing and mine makes me think of 
other things, we differ, but we do not yet disagree.  We only disagree 
when each of us thinks the other is not just different, but mistaken, and 
for the other to be mistaken, we must not only have different responses 
to the text; we must also have different beliefs about what the text 
means.  And the minute we have different beliefs about what the text 
means, we have become intentionalists, because the author’s intention is 
the only thing there is for us to disagree about. 
Why?  We have already seen that we cannot disagree—at least for 
long—about the text’s plain meaning.  That would just be a disagreement 
about what its words meant in English (or at least in the version of 
English Charlotte Bronte was writing in), and it would either be eliminated 
by consulting the relevant dictionary, or, once we analyzed what it was 
that made the relevant dictionary relevant, revealed as a disagreement 
about what she intended.  And we have also seen that we cannot disagree 
about our responses to the text because if you, as a gay man, think about 
one thing when you read it, and I, as a straight man, think about something 
else, we are not disagreeing, we are just thinking about different things.  
So we do not disagree about what the words mean, and we cannot 
disagree about what they make us think of, but we certainly can disagree 
about what Charlotte Bronte meant by them.  That is why the question of 
whether women really did have intense and eroticized (if not yet what 
we would call lesbian) friendships in the nineteenth century matters.  If 
 27. Id. at 61. 




they did, it gives us a reason to believe that Jane Eyre might plausibly be 
about such a friendship, which is to say a reason for believing that 
Bronte might have intended to explore the conditions that created such 
friendships.  If they didn’t, it doesn’t. 
Just as the question of whether women did have such friendships is a 
question about a matter of historical fact, so is the question of what 
Bronte intended, and thus of what Jane Eyre means.  This is to say that 
its meaning is indeed “fixed from the date of enactment.”  But the fact 
that it is fixed does not, of course, mean that our accounts of it are fixed.  
On the contrary, we have every reason to believe that people will 
continue to come up with new interpretations of old texts, and that our 
arguments about the meanings of at least some of them will never be 
resolved.  It should be clear, however, that the point of the intentionalism 
defended here is not to resolve such arguments, but to explain how they 
are possible, why they can count as arguments, and what they are 
arguments about.  Our point is that the possibility of interpretive 
disagreement—disagreement about what a text means as opposed, for 
example, to disagreement about what we should do—is entirely dependent 
upon our treating the text as an expression of its author’s intent. 
In his contribution to this volume, Jeffrey Goldsworthy appears to 
grant that interpreters, insofar as they are interpreting the text and not 
doing something else with it, necessarily treat a text as an expression of 
its author’s intent.  According to Goldsworthy, however, one can accept 
this thesis without succumbing to what he calls “strong intentionalism,” 
the thesis that a text means (if it means anything) what its author 
intended it to mean.  Instead, he proposes a position of “moderate 
intentionalism,” which adds to intentionalism the proviso that  
[f]or a text to mean what its author intended it to mean, it is necessary that its 
intended audience be capable of ascertaining its intended meaning.  This 
requires that the audience have access to persuasive evidence of that meaning, 
provided partly by the conventional meaning of the text and partly by other 
clues of the author’s intention, such as the context in which it was written.28 
Certainly it is true that, for an author to communicate what he intends 
to communicate, he is better off following the conventions he intends to 
follow, and providing the evidence he intends to provide.  But 
Goldsworthy goes further than that, arguing not only that the audience’s 
understanding is determined by the evidence available to it but also that 
the text’s meaning is determined by that evidence.  This is why, according 
to Goldsworthy, “[i]f the audience does not have access to such 
evidence, then not only will the author’s attempt to communicate his 
 28. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Moderate versus Strong Intentionalism: Knapp and 
Michaels Revisited, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669, 670 (2005). 
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intention fail, but the text will also not mean what he intended it to 
mean.”29  What, then, will it mean?  Goldsworthy’s answer is the 
following: The text will mean whatever the “readily available” evidence 
happens to suggest that it means.  “Moderate intentionalism is the thesis 
that the meaning of an utterance is the meaning which evidence readily 
available to its intended audience suggests that it was intended to 
mean.”30  Or as he also writes, “[m]oderate intentionalists . . . hold that 
what someone appears to have said, in the light of all the evidence 
readily available to his intended audience, is what he did say.”31 
It does not matter, then, if what an author appears to have intended—what 
the readily available clues suggest that she intended—differs from what 
she intended in fact, which of course will happen whenever the clues she 
intended to give are different from the clues her audience picks up.  
When it comes to meaning, according to Goldsworthy, appearance is 
reality. But now suppose that some members of her audience pick up 
one set of clues, while others pick up another set, so that the meaning, as 
it appears to some, is different from the meaning, as it appears to others.  
Which appearance counts? 
While acknowledging that it is an “arguably counterintuitive consequence” 
of his thesis,32 Goldsworthy embraces the only possible answer—they 
both do: 
 For example, if I intend a remark made during a conversation with Bob and 
Joe to be a joke, Bob might understand this but Joe might not.  Joe might take it 
to be an insult, not through any fault of his, but because I failed to appreciate 
that he does not know me as well as Bob, and therefore needs more clues of my 
jocular intention.  According to the moderate intentionalist, my remark has two 
meanings: it means one thing in the case of Bob, and another in the case of Joe, 
because they do not have ready access to the same evidence of my intention.33 
In other words, what Joe, out of ignorance, takes the remark to mean is 
one of the things it actually does mean, because, on moderate intentionalism, 
a text or utterance means whatever it appears to mean in light of 
whatever evidence happens to be available to its audience, or indeed to 
any subset of that audience.34  But of course there is no limit to the 
 29. Id. at 670. 
 30. Id. at 680. 
 31. Id. at 677. 
 32. Id. at 680. 
 33. Id.  
 34. It is not clear whether Goldsworthy believes that if he tells the joke and Joe 
does not get it, Joe is correct in thinking that Goldsworthy has insulted him.  It is not 




number of ways in which the available evidence can vary across 
members of the audience.  The available evidence—the way things 
appear—will suggest to some (those who, like Joe, do not know any 
better) that Marvell meant by “vegetable” what “vegetable” means in 
twenty-first-century English, to others what it means in Schmenglish, to 
still others what it means in any of a potentially infinite variety of future 
successor-languages.  And if all those meanings count as the right 
meanings, we are once again left without any way of understanding what 
people are up to when they think they are disagreeing about what a text 
means. 
In short, moderate intentionalism has all the faults of textualism; 
indeed, precisely the same faults.  It misses the main point of 
intentionalism: we can only make sense of what people are doing when 
they disagree with each other about the meaning of a text if we suppose 
that they regard the text as meaning what its author actually (and not just 
apparently) intended.  From that point of view, moderate intentionalism 
turns out not to be a version of intentionalism at all. 
If we want to make sense of interpretation, then, there is no getting 
away, even moderately, from the author’s intention.  Language counts; 
linguistic rules matter.  But we cannot even decide what language a text 
is written in—and therefore what rules matter, without deciding what 
language the author intended to write it  in—and therefore what rules the 
author was following.  And once we decide what rules the author was 
following, we cannot choose among the meanings those rules make 
possible without deciding which meaning the author actually intended. 
Our examples so far have all involved texts with single authors.  But 
there are many texts, including most legal texts, that are the products of 
multiple authors, sometimes working in close collaboration, but often 
separated by time, space, or institutional role.  So if the object of 
interpretation is what the author intended, what happens when a text has 
more than one author?  Its professed ability to answer that question is no 
doubt an abiding source of textualism’s appeal.  According to the 
clear, in other words, whether he thinks that just because Joe reasonably believes that he 
has been insulted, he has, in fact, been insulted.  It is pretty clear, however, that a 
commitment to treating reasonable beliefs as true beliefs will have interesting 
consequences not merely for the practice of interpretation, but for life in general 
(because it will now be possible for contradictory beliefs to be true).  But perhaps we can 
address what Goldsworthy is truly concerned about by noting that we might well want to 
hold people responsible for saying things that can be reasonably misinterpreted without 
also having to claim that the misinterpretation must be true.  And it is precisely (and 
only) with respect to the question of responsibility that the criterion of the reasonable 
becomes relevant—if we think Joe’s misinterpretation is reasonable, then we may hold 
Goldsworthy responsible; if we think it is not, we probably will not.  But if we think Joe 
is right—if we think what Goldsworthy said really was an insult—then it does not matter 
whether Joe’s interpretation is reasonable or not. 
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textualist, we do not have to worry about multiple authors because the 
text is the text, no matter who wrote it, and to interpret it is just to 
determine and apply its linguistic rules. But that answer, as we have 
seen, is no answer at all, because without referring to authorial intention, 
we cannot even tell what set of rules is the right one, let alone how to 
apply them. 
What does happen, then, when we have reason to think we are dealing 
with more than one author?  Of course, nothing prevents two or more 
authors from sharing the same intention, in which case there is clearly no 
problem in saying that the text was written in the language its multiple 
authors intended to write it in, and that what the text means is what its 
multiple authors intended it to mean in that language.  We can sharpen 
the question by asking: What do we do when we have reason to think 
that the text has multiple authors whose intentions did not agree, who 
were writing in different languages, or who were writing in the same 
language but used different dictionary meanings of the same words? 
This is an important question, but, for better or worse, intentionalism 
offers no more help in answering it than textualism does, although 
intentionalism perhaps helps to clarify what is going on when circumstances 
compel us to answer this question in the case of a particular text.  
Theoretically, there is only one option.  In cases where we have reason 
to think that a text’s authors were writing in different languages, or 
intending different meanings within a single language—either way, 
giving the signifiers different signifieds—the text has turned out to 
instantiate more than one object of interpretation, and we can only 
interpret it by choosing which of those objects we wish to interpret. 
Suppose, for instance, that Marvell’s “To his coy Mistress” had been 
written collaboratively by two different poets, Marvell and, say, 
Schmarvell.  Imagine that they wrote at that moment in the history of 
English when “vegetable” was shifting from its older meaning of 
“growing” to its now-current meaning of “edible plant-like.”  Marvell 
(we somehow discover) intended the older meaning, while Schmarvell 
intended the newer one.  It would be tempting under those circumstances 
to say that the word “vegetable,” as it appears in Marvell/Schmarvell’s 
poem, has both meanings.  But that solution turns out to be just as 
mistaken as the textualist’s claim that the word has whatever meaning 
the rules of the language impose on it.  For in the example, as we have 
imagined it, neither author intended the word “vegetable” to have both 
meanings.  And if it was not their intention that gave the word both 




meanings, what did?  Of course Marvell himself, in the actual case, 
could have intended both meanings (making “vegetable” a pun), and 
Marvell/Schmarvell, in our hypothetical case, could together have 
intended both meanings (again, producing the pun).  In either of those 
cases, however, we would be dealing with a single authorial intention to 
mean two different things, not with two different authorial intentions.  
We would have a single object of interpretation with two different 
meanings, not two different objects of interpretation.  But where the 
intentions differ, so do the objects of interpretation, and the interpreter 
cannot even begin without deciding which of those objects to interpret. 
Again, consider a case in which the difference between intended 
meanings would be even sharper than the difference between the 
successive English meanings of “vegetable.”  Two historians coauthor a 
book on the French Revolution.  As they trade drafts back and forth, at 
some point one of them inserts the following string of signifiers: “In 
1789, the streets of Paris were awash in canards.”  They intentionally 
publish the book with these signifiers included.  But they do not realize 
at the time that, by the signifier “canard,” one of them intends to signify 
(in English, as glossed by American Heritage35) “unfounded or false, 
deliberately misleading stor[ies],” while the other intends to signify (in 
French, as glossed by Larousse) ducks (because she wants to convey that 
the streets were unhealthily cluttered with livestock).  Would it make 
sense to argue that, although neither author intended this, the text is 
correctly interpreted as asserting that Paris was filled with baseless 
rumors and ducks?  Or should we simply say that the two authors 
inadvertently attached two different signifieds to the same signifier, 
thereby inadvertently producing two different signs, with two unrelated 
meanings?36 
The point here is that while there is no object of interpretation without 
authorial intention, a single set of signifiers—and therefore, in one 
sense, a single text—can instantiate multiple objects of interpretation.37  
 35. AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 11, at 270. 
 36. For a somewhat different use of the term “canard,” see Antonin Scalia, 
Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 
(1989–1990). 
 37. A single text in one sense because the term “text,” in debates of this kind, is 
sometimes used to mean a string of signifiers (just the marks without their meanings), 
and at other times—a string of signs (the marks and their meanings combined).  This 
terminological difference is irrelevant to the present point, which is that multiple authors 
can give multiple meanings to a single string of signifiers.  For the classic literary 
treatment of this phenomenon see JORGE LUIS BORGES, Pierre Menard, Author of the 
Quixote, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 88 (Andrew Hurley trans., Viking Penguin 1998) 
(1989).  The story is presented as a postmortem review of Menard, a twentieth century 
French author of the Symboliste school whose main literary ambition was “to produce a 
number of pages which coincided—word for word and line for line—with those of 
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When applied to poetry, this point does not seem especially consequential.  
Not only do poets collaborate rather rarely, but it is also hard to see what 
harm would result from discovering two different poems where there 
seemed to be only one.  When applied to the law, on the other hand, this 
point can be very consequential.  Legal texts are often the products of 
multiple stages of drafting and ratification, not to mention the revision 
that some say occurs in judicial review.  But nothing in the logic of 
interpretation itself can tell us which of those stages should count as the 
one that confers on the text the meaning we are trying to interpret when 
we try to obey the law or to adjudicate it. 
We have argued that it does not make sense to wonder whether to 
interpret a text according to authorial intention or linguistic rules; there 
is never an option, because without authorial intention, we do not even 
know what rules to apply.  But it can indeed make sense to wonder 
which author or authors’ intention is the one that matters for a particular 
legal, institutional, or political purpose.  Unfortunately, knowing that the 
first question is not a real one provides no help in answering the second 
question, which is.  So we have answered Scalia’s “basic question,” but 
only by replacing it with another one.  The basic question was the 
following: “What are we looking for when we construe a statute?”38  The 
answer is (not only with statutes but with all texts) that we are looking 
for the author’s intention.  It is only if we are looking for the author’s (or 
authors’) intention that the problem of interpretive disagreement—the 
problem that interpretive theory is designed to solve—can arise. In the 
course of answering the basic question, however, we have also shown 
that some of the real problems have nothing to do with interpretive 
disagreement after all.  If we are trying to decide whether “vegetable” 
means “growing” or “edible plant-like,” we may not be trying to choose 
Miguel de Cervantes.”  Id. at 91.  He had no interest in composing a different version of 
the Quixote or in merely copying it, and abandoned as too easy the idea of somehow 
becoming Cervantes; he preferred “continuing to be Pierre Menard and coming to the 
Quixote through the experiences of Pierre Menard.”  Id.  In other words, his ambition 
was literally to produce from scratch the same set of signifiers but with a different 
meaning.  Borges’ fictional reviewer illustrates Menard’s achievement by quoting 
identical strings of signifiers side by side and offering comments like the following: 
“The Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical, but the second is almost 
infinitely richer.  (More ambiguous, his detractors will say—but ambiguity is richness.)”  
Id. at 94.  Whatever one thinks of his aesthetic judgments,  Borges’ reviewer has exactly 
the right theoretical take on what happens when a single string of signifiers is produced 
with two different authorial intentions. 
 38. Scalia, supra note 4, at 16. 
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between two different meanings of the same poem—we may be trying to 
decide between two different poems, Marvell’s and Schmarvell’s.  And 
if we are trying to decide whether “canards” means “false stories” or 
“ducks,” we may not be trying to choose between two different meanings of 
the same sign, but between two different signs. 
In the context of legal controversy, there are, no doubt, situations in 
which it is hard to tell what the authors of a law intended their signs to 
mean.  In those situations, the problem we are trying to solve is an 
interpretive one, and solving that problem involves finding the best 
evidence we can of what the authors intended.  But the harder problem 
may be to decide which among the various layers of authorship is the 
one that counts.  And if that is the problem we are trying to solve—not 
about what the signs mean, but about whose signs are the ones that 
matter—then the solution, whatever it is, will not be a matter of 
interpretation. 
 
